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Abstract 
Recently, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCT) became increasingly popular in developing countries due to 
their positive outcomes on health and education. In this paper, we are particularly interested in testing if 
children participating in CCT (treated) in conflict affected regions benefit more (or less) than their counterparts 
in peaceful areas. To test this, we combine longitudinal CCT data from Colombia with a conflict event dataset. 
This allows us to use standard techniques in treatment evaluation, but it augments the testing equations by 
adding interactions between dummies identifying different groups and indicators of violence. We find that the 
CCT program had an extra benefit in conflict areas concerning enrolment. However, grade progression is similar 
for treated children in low and high conflict regions. Results suggest that the program may work in attracting 
children to school, but in high conflict regions children tend to do less homework and miss more days in school. 
 
JEL classification codes: C23, D74, I21, I38, O54 
Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfer Program, Education, Conflict, Colombia, Panel Data, 
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1.  Introduction 
In  the  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  large  interest  in  understanding  policies  aimed  at 
targeting vulnerable populations. One example of this development are policies aiming at 
households in conflict areas (Fearon et al 2009, Jordans et al. 2010).  These policies may not 
only avert further deterioration in welfare conditions (e.g. health, income) but also foster 
post-conflict recovery through different channels (human capital accumulation, rebuilding 
trust, reducing inter-racial tensions, etc.) 
 One of the common policies prescribed for vulnerable population (not only those in 
conflict)  are  Conditional  Cash  Transfer  (CCT)  programs,  which  aim  at  ameliorating  the 
constraint that prevent poor children to accumulate human capital in the form of school 
enrollment and adequate food intake. These programs were implemented in the developing 
world  (e.g  Bangladesh,  Mexico,  Colombia,  Argentina,  and  Turkey).  Different  researchers 
have rigorously evaluated the effectiveness of these programs on different outcomes (e.g. 
health, schooling, see Gertler 2004 for an example of a CCT evaluation).  
In this paper, we integrate the findings of the literature of program evaluation with that 
of micro-level analysis of households in conflict (Verwimp et al. 2009). We make use of 
longitudinal  data  generated  by  a  CCT  program  in  Colombia  (Attanasio  et  al.  2010)  to 
understand  to  what  extent  the  program  helps  those  made  vulnerable  by  conflict.  By 
combining  with  a  very  detailed  longitudinal  dataset  on  conflict  events  in  Colombia 
(disaggregated at municipality levels), we can evaluate whether the treatment effect of the 
program (increased enrollment, grade progression) was homogeneous across treated areas 
or whether there is evidence of heterogeneity. In this paper we are particularly interested in 
testing if children treated (participating in the CCT) in conflict afflicted regions benefited 
more (or less) than their counterparts in more peaceful areas. To test this, we make use of   2 
standard  techniques  in  treatment  evaluation,  but  it  augments  the  testing  equations  by 
adding  interactions  between  dummies  identifying  different  groups  and  indicators  of 
violence.
1  
A priori, it is not clear whether treatment would be more effective in high-conflict vs. 
low-conflict areas. On the one hand, if households believe that schools will be targets of 
rebel groups (because they may receive additional resources or distribute food), schooling 
may  increase  less  in  high-conflict  areas,  because  schooling  brings  under  treatment  an 
additional cost in the form of risk of violence. However, households in high conflict areas 
may suffer from economic hardships and sizeable transfers (conditional on schooling) may 
prompt  households  to  send  children  to  school  (and  perhaps  consider  sending  them  for 
longer time, leading to extra grade advancement). We find that the CCT program had an 
extra benefit in conflict areas in terms of enrollment of children ages 8 to 17 (at the last 
follow-up).  However,  grade  progression  is  similar  for  treated  students  in  low  and  high 
conflict  regions.  We  reconcile  these  findings  exploiting  the  richness  of  the  survey.  The 
program may work in attracting children to school, but in high conflict regions, children tend 
to do less homework (at least in terms of hours/day) and miss more days in school. This 
counteracts the positive effect found in terms of enrollment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a background on related literature and 
on the Colombian conflict. Section 3 introduces the CCT program, called Familias en Acción 
(Families  in  Action).  Section  4  presents  descriptive  statistics.  Section  5  describes  the 
empirical  strategy  and  presents  the  main  findings,  while  section  6  discusses  different 
channels that might explain the results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 It is important to consider two important facts. First, by construction, conflict is uncorrelated with assignment 
of individuals to different groups. Second, in the last wave, our indicator of violence (log of attacks by illegal 
groups) was uncorrelated with assignment to treatment or control.   3 
 
2. Motivation 
A. Related Literature 
There are just few related papers on Colombia dealing with this topic. Largely, they can be 
grouped into three categories: (i) the impact of violence and conflict on education, (ii) the 
influence of welfare programs on household decision-making in a violent environment and 
(iii) the effect of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs on education.  
There  are  four  papers  studying  the  impact  of  violent  conflict  on  educational  outcomes. 
Barrera  and  Ibáñez  (2004)  present  a  theoretical  model  that  identifies  three  different 
mechanisms through which violence influences decisions on educational investments. First, 
violence might change the utility of households influencing investments in and consumption 
of education. Second, violence often includes the destruction of physical capital and creates 
an atmosphere of uncertainty leading to reductions in investments and production. This 
development induces negative income shocks on households who consequently cut back 
their investments in education. Third, a violent environment could decrease the return on 
education causing less investment in education. When testing their theory empirically for 
Colombia,  Barrera and  Ibáñez  indeed  find  lower  enrolment  rates  in  those  municipalities 
where homicide rates are above the national median.  
Sánchez and Diaz (2005) show that between 1995 and 2002 in municipalities which have 
contacts with illegally armed groups, enrolment rates for primary and secondary schools did 
not increase as much as in peaceful municipalities. More students drop out of school in 
conflict-affected  municipalities  either  because  they  are  recruited  by  one  of  the  conflict 
parties or they fear to go to school because of threats by armed groups and public order 
disruptions.    4 
Dueñas and Sánchez (2007) detect for the eastern region of Colombia that activities of illegal 
armed  groups  raises  the  likelihood  to  drop  out  of  school.  This  development  was 
disproportionally observed for poor households.  
Rodríguez  and  Sánchez  (2009)  find  that  armed  conflict  leads  to  school  drop  out  and 
increases child labor for children older than eleven years old. They conclude that in conflict-
affected areas households experience negative economic shocks, a lower life expectancy and 
lower school quality which makes attending school less attractive and participating in the 
labor market at a young age more attractive. Rodríguez and Sánchez (2010) investigate the 
impact of armed conflict on the quality of schooling. Their results indicate that school quality 
in  conflict  zones  is  lower  because  of  the  low  quality  of  teachers  in  these  regions.  In  a 
nutshell, conflict and violence have a negative impact on education in Colombia according to 
these studies. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is just one study investigating the effect of welfare 
programs on the decisions of households living in a violent environment. Mesnard (2009) 
analyses migration decisions of very poor Colombian households who are experiencing high 
levels of violence in their communities and at the same time are participating in the welfare 
program Familias en Acción. She concludes that until a certain threshold of violence the 
program prevents people from migrating and enjoying the subsidy. However, if violence 
exceeds this threshold, households receiving the benefits are more likely to migrate than 
comparable households without the subsidy. Her explanation for this behavior is that the 
subsidy  relaxes  liquidity  constraints  and  allows  households  to  migrate  when  living  in  an 
extremely violent environment.  
There  are  three  papers  studying  the  impact  of  conditional  cash  transfer  programs  in 
Colombia.  Attanasio  et  al.  (2010)  analyse  the  effect  of  the  CCT  Familias  en  Acción  on   5 
enrolment rates and work participation. They find that the program increases enrolment 
especially for older children and children living in urban areas. Additionally, children spent 
less time on household chores that before the implementation of the program.  
Garcia and Hill (2010) are using data from Familias en Acción as well, but they focus on 
school achievement and retention rates instead of enrolment. They find that the subsidy has 
a positive impact on school achievement of children aged 7-12 living in rural areas but a 
negative effect of achievement of teenagers. One reason for this negative effect might be 
due to the fact that the supply side remained unchanged when introducing the program 
while at the same time enrolment rates of adolescents rose. This development leads to 
deterioration of the quality of education due to larger classes which in turn results in low 
achievement results of students. 
Barrera et al. (2008) test the impact of three different versions of a CCT implemented in 
Bogotá: the first version is just based on attendance and is paid out on a regular basis, the 
second  is  a  savings  treatment  that  postpones  a  great  part  of  the  subsidy  (based  on 
attendance in the current year) till the re-enrolment and the third version is not based on 
attendance but graduation. Their overall conclusion is that targeted children are more likely 
to attend school and to stay enrolled and at the same time are more likely to graduate and 
to enlist in a tertiary institution. Particularly effective in this context is the savings treatment 
taking into account poor family’s liquidity constraints and treatment based on graduation 
rather than on pure attendance. However, the program has a negative impact on siblings of 
treated students: they work more and their attendance rate is lower than that of students 
from untreated families. Their overall conclusion is that the design of a CCT matters for 
success.   6 
The new feature about our paper is that it combines elements of all categories: we are 
analysing if a welfare program has a different impact on enrolment rates, depending on 
whether the household lives in a conflict-affected area or not. By doing so, we want to check 
whether program benefits could mitigate the negative impact of violence (as in Mesnard 
2009) on educational outcomes mentioned in Barrera and Ibáñez (2004) and Rodríguez and 
Sánchez (2009; 2010). Additionally we contribute to the CCT literature and its impact on 
education by including the conflict / violence dimension, which is a relevant aspect in a 
conflict-affected country like Colombia. 
B. Colombia 
I. Education  
Central government and municipalities share the responsibility for educational matters. The 
government sets up the curriculum, distributes teachers and wages to the municipalities and 
provides financing (originating from income and VAT taxes). The municipalities administer 
these funds and are responsible for establishing and maintaining educational institutions in 
their districts. Some municipalities invest additional capital in education coming from local 
funds via the collection of property taxes. 
Colombia’s schooling system consists of three categories. Children start the first grade at age 
five to seven and finish basic primary with the completion of the fifth grade. Afterwards they 
continue with basic secondary (grades six to nine). Basic primary and basic secondary are 
referred to as basic education and are compulsory in Colombia. After having completed basic 
education, students can continue middle secondary (grades ten and eleven) in order to get 
accepted at a university or a vocational school. The academic year starts in January and 
finishes in the middle of November (Barrera et al. 2008).    7 
As in many low and middle income countries, in Colombia there is a large gap between 
enrolment rates in primary and secondary school: while the net attendance rate for primary 
school  reaches  91%,  the  rate  drops  to  68%  for  secondary  schools  (2004/2005,  DHS  on 
childinfo.org). Several reasons are responsible for this development: (i) high school fees and 
other costs associated with education, (ii) opportunity costs go up since the students could 
also  work  and  earn  some  money,  (iii)  low  quality  of  schooling  and  little  relevance  of 
curriculum for after school life and, (iv) limited opportunities to continue education after 
completion of secondary school (Word Bank 2008). These factors are particularly relevant 
for children living in rural areas and/or in poor families since in these groups attendance 
rates for secondary school are below 50% (2004/2005, DHS on childinfo.org).  
II. Conflict 
The Colombian conflict has its roots in the unequal distribution of land and wealth. It was 
fuelled by the establishment of two left wing guerrilla groups – the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces in Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in the 1960s (Guigale et 
al., 2002). As to protect themselves against these groups, landowners and drug lords started 
right  wing  paramilitary  groups.  In  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  violence  related  to  the 
narcotics  business  increased.  In  the  1990s,  the  guerrilla  became  involved  in  the  drug 
business as well which intensified the ongoing conflict (Meléndez and Harker, 2008). 
 As  a  result  of  the  conflict  between  1998  and  2002,  4.2  million  people  were  internally 
displaced, representing about 10% of the population (Calderón and Ibáñez, 2009).  
In 2002, the beginning of our period of study, Uribe was elected president of Colombia. He 
put an emphasis on democratic security policy to regain state control over the Colombian 
territory. This aim was achieved by increasing military spending, expanding police presence 
to all municipalities, eradicating coca cultivation, fighting the guerrilla and demobilizing the   8 
paramilitaries.  The  results  of  this  policy  are  mixed:  on  the  one  hand  the  number  of 
kidnappings, homicides and paramilitaries reduced significantly but on the other hand not 
only did new armed groups emerge, but there is an increased number of armed contacts, 
thus signalling that the war is still ongoing (International Crisis Group, 2003; Presidencia de 
la República and Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2003). 
 
3. The Data 
We use three types of data: (i) a household survey coming from the Familias en Acción 
program,  (ii)  a  municipality  level  dataset  on  violence  and  conflict  and  (iii)  a  dataset 
describing the economic situation of municipalities.  
The  first  dataset  was  established  in  order  to  analyze  the  effects  of  a  Conditional  Cash 
Transfer (CCT) program on nutrition, health and education of children aged 0-17. It was 
implemented  by  the  Colombian  government,  the  World  Bank  and  the  Inter-American 
Development Bank. The first survey was conducted in 2002, the second survey was carried 
out in 2003 and the third survey took place in 2005 or 2006, respectively. These surveys 
collected  information  on  more  than  11,000  poor  households  living  in  122  rural 
municipalities. In order to be eligible for the program, a municipality had to dispose over a 
bank  as  well  as  over  basic  education  and  health  infrastructure.  Additionally,  the 
municipality’s number of inhabitants should not exceed 100,000. 57 municipalities fulfilled 
these criteria and thus received the program and 65 missed at least one criterion and are so 
called  control  municipalities.  In  26  out  of  57  treatment  municipalities  the  program  was 
already  started  before  the  first  survey  was  conducted.  That  is  why  we  will  call  these 
municipalities early treatment municipalities in the remainder of this paper. Accordingly,   in 
late treatment municipalities the program was just implemented after the first survey. Every   9 
family living in a treatment municipality with at least one child aged 0 – 17 and belonging to 
the poorest quintile (SISBEN 1) of the population is qualified for the program.
 2  
The mother receives a monthly subsidy of 14,000 pesos (US$ 6) per child attending primary 
school and 28,000 pesos (US$ 12) per child going to secondary school. In order to receive the 
benefits, a child has to attend 80% of the classes. Additionally, mothers get 46,500 pesos (ca. 
US$ 20) for children aged 0-6 if they bring them to health check-ups and attend classes on 
nutrition, hygiene, etc. (Attanasio et al. 2010, Mesnard 2009). Compared to the minimum 
wage of 309,000 pesos (ca. US$ 135) in 2002, these transfers could make up a substantial 
share  of  a  household’s  income:  for  a  family  with  one  child  in primary  and  one  child  in 
secondary school, the subsidy is about 13.5% of the minimum wage and if this family has an 
additional child aged 0-6, the subsidy increases to 29% of the minimum wage. 
We used the first and the sixth module of the household surveys for our analysis. In these 
modules  information  about  the  socio-economic  structure  of  the  household,  housing 
conditions,  household  assets,  education,  access  to  infrastructure,  usage  of  healthcare 
services,  household  consumption,  labor  supply,  income  and  transfers  were  collected. 
Moreover, we included some information of the municipality questionnaire on health and 
educational institutions and commercial activity in our dataset. 
The  second  dataset,  assembled  by  Universidad  de  los  Andes’  Center  of  Economic 
Development Studies (CEDE for its acronym in Spanish), includes information about violence 
and  conflict  intensity  (which  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  later)  and  it  also  contains 
municipality characteristics. These characteristics include the department the municipality is 
located in, the total inhabitants of each municipality as well as the share of urban and rural 
population at municipality level. Since the homicide rates are missing for the years 2005 and 
                                                 
2 See Attanasio et al. (2006) for details regarding the selection process on treatment and control municipalities.   10 
2006,  we  complemented  this  dataset  with  data  on  homicide  rates  obtained  from  the 
National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE for its acronym in Spanish) and the 
National Police. 
The  third  dataset  comes  from  Colombia’s  National  Planning  Department  (DNP  for  its 
acronym  in  Spanish)  and  comprises  information  on  the  municipality’s  industrial  and 
commercial taxes (ICA for its acronym in Spanish). Since taxes were indicated in current 
Colombian pesos we converted them into real Colombian pesos using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) calculated by DANE. Tax collection indicators capture the municipality’s economic 
situation, which affects labor demand and may also have an impact on the level of violence.  
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
A.  Enrollment Rates, Household and Municipality Characteristics in Treatment and Control 
Areas 
Our empirical analysis focuses on a sample of more than 18,000 children aged 8 – 17 in the 
second survey. As illustrated in section 2BI, enrolment rates vary with age and rural-urban 
provenance. For this reason we divided the children into four subgroups: (i) children aged 8 
– 13 living in rural areas, (ii) children aged 14-16 living in rural areas, (iii) children aged 8-13 
from urban areas and, (iv) children aged 14 – 16 from urban areas.   
Additionally, we have to take into account whether a child belongs to the treatment or 
control group in order to observe whether the development of enrolment rates is different 
in  the  treatment  and  control  group.  Remember  that  we  have  two  different  treatment 
groups: families in early treatment municipalities already receive the subsidy before the first 
survey whereas households in late treatment municipalities only do so after the first survey. 
A problem could be that households of the late treatment group know that they will receive   11 
the program soon and change their behavior now anticipating the program. Thus, children in 
treatment municipalities either get the program or have knowledge about it which might 
contaminate/influence enrolment rates in the first survey. In order to avoid this problem we 
include retrospective data from 2001 on enrolment which we will refer to as baseline in the 
following.
3  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Enrolment rates for children aged 8-13 living in rural areas at baseline are 89% for late 
treatment  municipalities,  91%  for  early  treatment  municipalities  and  86%  for  control 
municipalities.  Over  time,  the  enrolment  rate  increases  by  6%  in  late  treatment 
municipalities, 4% in early treatment municipalities and 3% in control municipalities. We 
observe that even before the start of the program, enrolment rates are lowest in control 
areas and grow less over time compared to treatment regions. The picture is similar for 
children (8-13) going primary school in urban areas: enrolment rates for late treatment and 
control  municipalities  are  93%  and  reach  96%  for  early  treatment  municipalities.  Again, 
enrolment rates grow faster in late treatment municipalities than in early treatment and 
control regions. 
Enrolment rates for adolescents (14-16) attending secondary school in rural areas reach 60% 
in early treatment regions, 58% in late treatment municipalities and just 52% in control areas 
at baseline. Rates grow by 14% and 13% in late and early treatment groups, respectively, but 
just by 7% in the control group. Enrolment rates for children (14-16) going to secondary 
school in urban areas are higher than in rural areas initially but grow at a lower rate. Again, 
initial  enrolment  is  highest  in  early  treatment  municipalities  (86%),  followed  by  late 
                                                 
3 See section on methodology for potential anticipation effects.   12 
treatment (76%) and control municipalities (73%). Across time, enrolment rates increase 
about 10% in treatment groups and 6% in the control group.  
To sum up, we observe enrolment rates are lower in rural areas than in urban areas and 
decrease  from  primary  to  secondary  school.  In  each  of  the  four  subgroups  (urban/rural 
primary; urban/rural secondary) the initial enrolment rate is highest in the early treatment 
group and lowest in the control group. Over time, enrolment rates grow faster in the late 
treatment group than in early treatment and control municipalities. Hence, at the time of 
the  third  survey,  enrolment  rates  in  early  and  late  treatment  municipalities  are 
approximately the same, whereas they are still lower in control municipalities. However, we 
do not know at this stage if the program leads to a higher increase of enrolment rates in 
treatment  municipalities  or  if  these  municipalities  are  inherently  different  from  control 
municipalities.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 summarizes some of the main characteristics across early treatment, late treatment 
and control areas at the first survey. We observe that there are no significant differences 
across treatment and control group with respect to (i) age of child, head of household and 
spouse, (ii) whether a child is female, (iii) educational level of head of household and spouse. 
There are small differences with respect to the material used to build the walls of the house 
and  the  services  available.  Overall,  households  in  treatment  and  control  areas  are  not 
significantly different from each other according to these characteristics. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 presents some characteristics of treatment and control municipalities. We observe 
that  treatment  and  control  groups  are  significantly  different  in  about  50%  of  the 
characteristics. There are no differences across treatment and control areas with respect to   13 
(i)  proportion  of  households  with  sewage  facilities,  (ii)  urban  population,  (ii)  number  of 
urban public schools, (iv) number of health centers, (v) number of banks and (vi) share of 
households coming from the Oriental or the Pacific region. Control municipalities possess 
less rural public schools, hospitals, small health care centers and pharmacies than treatment 
municipalities.  The  rural  population  in  control  areas  is  greater  and  the  proportion  of 
households with piped water is higher than in treatment areas. Moreover, significantly more 
households from the control group live in the Atlantic and the Central region. In a nutshell, 
control  municipalities  are  more  rural  and  dispose  over  less  infrastructure  (an  exception 
being the proportion of households with piped water) than treatment municipalities. 
B. Violence/Conflict  
We proxy the level of conflict at the village level using very disaggregated data provided by 
CEDE. In our sample, the median number of attacks of illegal groups (paramilitaries and 
guerrillas) per village is 0.35% of observations include at least one attack, and 17% more 
than 2 attacks in the municipality. At baseline, the mean number of attacks per municipality 
(for the sample in the regressions shown in section 5) was 0.94 incidents/year (max=10). It 
increased to 1.20 incidents/year in the first wave (max=14) and decreased to 0.43 (max=7) in 
the second follow up.  Because of the skewness of the number of attacks we have resorted 
to log(1+attacks), called log(attacks) as a variable of interest, to avoid large influence of 
extreme values. Figure 1 displays a kernel density estimate of log(attacks). 
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5. Estimation Strategy and Econometric Results 
We use panel data on school enrollment and school progression, including baseline data. At 
the  time  of  the  first  survey  the  program  had  already  started  in  early  treatment  areas. 
Because treatment units were decided but not implemented at the same time, anticipation 
effects  may  have  affected  households  that  were  deemed  to  be  treated  in  the  future 
(Attanasio et al. 2010). 
The basic specification that we use to estimate the impact of the program on outcome Y 
follows Attanasio et al. (2010). In a linear model, this is represented as follows: 
2
0 1 2 3 4
1
( ) it j it it
j
Y I t j P A T Z u a a a a a q
=
= + = + + + + + ∑            (1) 
for  t=0  (baseline),  t=1  (first  survey)  and  t=2  (second  survey).  In  the  first  wave,  some 
treatment areas had already received the program support, whereas others (late treatment) 
were still to receive the program. In t=2 all treatment areas had received treatment. P=1 is a 
dummy for treatment areas (regardless of whether they were early or late treatment), and 0 
otherwise. A=1 in late treatment areas in t=1. T=1 for late treatment areas in t=2. Zit is a 
vector of pre-program characteristics at the individual, household and community levels
4. 
The coefficient of interest to measure the effect of the program is α. 
In our case, we are interested in how the program effect varies with conflict variable X. 
                                                 
4 A the individual level, we control for groups defined whether the individual was aged 8-13 or 14-17 at the 
time of the second survey interacted by the urban-rural status of where s(he) lives. This defines 4 groups. A 
linear time trend interacted with group dummies is also included.  
 We also control for age and age squared and sex of the student at baseline, as well as the interaction of age 
with sex. Household characteristics control for whether the household has the following services: electricity, 
gas (by pipe), water (by pipe), sewage system, rubbish collection, whether the household used loans to buy the 
land/build the property, whether the household was built with bricks, mud, wood, cardboard. Age of the head 
of  household  and  his(her)  spouse  is  also  included,  along  with  a  dummy  for  whether  the  head  is  female, 
educational categories for head of household and spouse and labor situation of the head of household. 
Community level controls are the log (urban/rural) population, log (population), log(Industry and Commerce 
taxes  per  capita),  number  of  hospitals,  health  facilities  (small/large),  number  of  schools  (urban/rural)  and 
number of pharmacies.  
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it j it it
j
Y I t j P A T P X A X T X Z u a a a a a a a a q
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In this case, the value of interest is: 
4 4
X X a a + ´                                                                                      (3) 
which measures the difference in Y operated by the interaction of treatment and conflict 
variable X. This shows us the differential effect of treatment with respect to a comparable 
individual  given  a  particular  level  of  conflict  variable  X.  This  specification  creates  a 
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X X T X T X a a a + ´ + ´                                               (5) 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table  4  shows  probit  estimates  of  (1),  (3),  and  (5),  for  the  dichotomous  outcome  of 
enrollment, where X=log(attacks against civilians by illegal armed groups). To calculate the 
impact on the probabilities of enrollment in a nonlinear model, we simulate the impact of T 
for plausible values of X. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
This  results  in  Figure  2.  The  impact  of the  program  is  nonlinear  in the  (log)  number  of 
attacks. The effect appears to be positive and significant in cases where attacks level are 
higher than 1.25 log(attacks)/year (as a reference 1.39  log(attacks)/year ranks in percentile 
90) This suggests that the program is particularly successful where is  needed (in regions 
where schooling was negatively affected by conflict).   16 
However, enrollment per se may not be a good indicator of human capital accumulation, 
whereas grade progression would. In this case, we estimate (1), (3) and (5) by using Y=grade 
progression with respect to baseline. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 shows OLS estimates for grade where X=log(attacks) against civilians by illegal armed 
groups). Because OLS is a linear model, interactions are easier to compute. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Results are plotted in Figure 3. The impact of the program is only significant in villages with 
low levels of (log) attacks. However, since the log(attack) distribution is highly skewed to the 
right,  most  treatment  villages  undergoing  attacks  (albeit  low  levels)  benefit  from  the 
program in terms of grade progression. 
 
6. Discussion of Results 
The impact of the program differs by the intensity of conflict, mainly in terms of schooling, 
but not in terms of grade progression. What could explain these findings? 
First, we used data on time use of children ages 8-17 in the second wave. As before, we 
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where Yat is the time (in hours/day) that the individual spent on a certain activity.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 6 shows all types of activities considered. As before, we selected some activities for 
which  there  were  differential  effects  of  treatment  on  time  use  (conditional  on  attack   17 






a T X T X a a a + ´ + ´ . This is 
displayed in Figure 4.  
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
We observe that hours spent in school is almost constant on log(attacks) when compared to 
subjects not receiving treatment. However, as conflict level increases, children in school tend 
to devote more hours to paid work (out of home), affecting in a detrimental way hours 
devoted  to  homework.  This  could  explain  why  despite  an  increasing  enrollment  gap  in 
log(attacks) (comparing T=1 vs T=0) the same trend is not observed in grade progression. 
Second, to explain the rise in hours worked, one needs to observe what happens at the 
household  level.  Our  conjecture  is  that  conflict  adversely  affects  the  ability  to  generate 
household income by the head/spouse. To check this, we perform a panel regression with 
fixed (individual-time) effects: 
2
2
1 2 3 4 5 6
1
ln( ) ( ) it i j it
j
Income I t j P A T X X u a a a a a a a
=
= + = + + + + + + ∑                                     (7) 
This is run for heads of households and his (her) spouses and it includes all type of income. 
The  sample  size  is  56,475  observations.  We  then  compute  the  impact  of  attacks  on 
log(income), which is displayed in Figure 5.  
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
Here we observe that as the number of attacks increases, the household falls under strict 
income constraints. It is plausible that in this scenario, heads of household may consider 
more  eagerly  apply  for  the  cash  transfer,  while  at  the  same  time,  may  try  to  ask  their 
children  to  work  some  hours  (if  a  job  is  available).  Both  actions  may  alleviate  income 
constraints and are therefore compatible with our findings shown in Figure 4.   18 
Third, we would also like to know if part of the difference between attendance and grade 















Y I t j P A T P X A X T X
P X A X T X Z u
a a a a a a a a
a a a q
=
= + = + + + + ´ + ´ + ´
+ ´ + ´ + ´ + +
∑
                (8) 
 where this time Y is the number of days the student missed school in the last month. We 





X X T X T X a a a + ´ + ´   and 
obtain  as  a  result  figure  6.  Thus,  even  if  minimal  (on  average,  a  student  misses  3.15 
days/month),  the  absenteeism  channel  may  be  operating  in  detriment  of  grade 
advancement. The students can be still considered enrolled, but their “investment” (in terms 
of school presence) is reduced. 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
In sum, there are several channels that explain the results shown in section 5. Households 
under  conflict  may  experience  hardships.  A  conditional  cash  transfer  program  is  badly 
needed  in  these  circumstances.  This  explains  the  higher  enrollment  “return”  in  conflict 
areas. However, at the same time, the hardships may condition grade progression because 




There  are  few  papers  documenting  the  effectiveness  of  policy  interventions  in  conflict 
affected  regions.  Here,  we  used  longitudinal  data  from  a  Conditional  Cash  Transfer 
intervention in Colombia together with a rich dataset on conflict events (disaggregated by 
year and municipality level) to understand to what extent these transfers could alleviate the   19 
hardship of households in conflicts. We find that these programs are effective in conflict 
areas (in the sense that the treatment effect is larger in high conflict vs. low conflict areas) at 
least in terms of increasing enrollment. However, they are not a panacea and thus we do not 
find heterogeneous effects in terms of grade progression. 
With the data at hand, we provide evidence that the lack of extra improvement in grade 
progression is driven by different factors. Treated children in conflict areas tend to do less 
homework and work more than children with similar attributes in low conflict areas. This 
may  reduce  the  speed  of  human  capital  accumulation.  Moreover,  school  attendance  is 
affected to some degree by conflict (comparing “treated” in conflict vs. low conflict areas), 
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9. Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Enrolment Rates in Late-Treat, Early-Treat and Control Areas in Baseline, First, Second and 
Third Surveys (%) 
   Late Treat  Early Treat  Control 
Rural 8-13        
Baseline  88.77  91.23  85.92 
First Survey  91.67  93.21  83.35 
Second Survey  91.30  93.29  84.75 
Third Survey  94.55  94.88  88.98 
Rural 14-16        
Baseline  57.51  60.17  51.69 
First Survey  59.38  59.91  43.56 
Second Survey  62.74  67.37  50.60 
Third Survey  71.95  72.67  59.01 
Urban 8-13        
Baseline  92.92  96.52  93.39 
First Survey  95.23  95.56  90.43 
Second Survey  95.22  95.88  91.59 
Third Survey  97.00  98.29  95.62 
Urban 14-16        
Baseline  75.88  85.93  73.15 
First Survey  75.57  83.80  68.55 
Second Survey  78.62  86.58  73.42 
Third Survey  85.26  87.39  78.97 
Note: Baseline data refer to a preprogram period; age at baseline is age at first survey - 1. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Main Characteristics across Late-Treat, Early-Treat and Control Areas at 
the First Survey 
   Late Treat  SD  Early Treat  SD  Control  SD 
Age of Child  11.020  2.830  11.190  2.830  11.120  2.810 
Child is female  0.477  0.499  0.479  0.499  0.469  0.499 
Age of Head  44.648  12.200  45.526  12.300  45.594  12.680 
Age of Spouse  39.177  10.420  39.781  10.582  40.147  11.113 
Education level of head             
None  0.283  0.451  0.258  0.438  0.265  0.442 
Primary (complete & incomplete)  0.606  0.489  0.624  0.484  0.601  0.489 
Secondary or higher  0.111  0.314  0.118  0.322  0.134  0.341 
Education level of spouse             
None  0.222  0.416  0.202  0.401  0.221  0.415 
Primary (complete & incomplete)  0.661  0.473  0.676  0.468  0.626  0.484 
Secondary or higher  0.117  0.321  0.122  0.328  0.153  0.360 
House walls             
Brick  0.442  0.497  0.415  0.493  0.473  0.499 
Mud  0.414  0.493  0.379  0.485  0.325  0.468 
Good quality wood  0.104  0.305  0.147  0.354  0.164  0.370 
Bad quality wood  0.029  0.169  0.043  0.203  0.024  0.154 
Cardboard/None  0.010  0.101  0.150  0.122  0.140  0.116 
Has piped gas  0.061  0.240  0.099  0.299  0.086  0.280 
Has piped water  0.655  0.473  0.528  0.499  0.646  0.478 
Has sewage system  0.285  0.452  0.197  0.398  0.258  0.438 
Has rubbish collection  0.303  0.460  0.252  0.434  0.352  0.478 
Note: Sample of households with at least one child aged 8-17 in the second survey. 
 
   24 
Table 3: Characteristics of Treatment and Control Municipalities 
   Treatment    Control   
Proportion of households with piped water  0.597  [0.491]  0.649  [0.477]* 
Proportion of households with sewage facilities  0.252  [0.434]  0.265  [0.442] 
Urban population   16310.53  [17981.92]  13334.48  [17172.30] 
Rural population   13394.68  [7898.578]  8062.092  [7658.948]* 
Number of urban public schools  8.679  [8.253]  6.692  [8.253] 
Number of rural public schools  42.464  [3.996]  25.554  [23.437]* 
Number of hospitals  0.857  [0.401]  0.646  [0.482]* 
Number of health care centers  1.071  [1.412]  0.815  [1.144] 
Number of small health care centers  5.054  [4.317]  3.292  [4.996]* 
Number of pharmacies  9.768  [7.500]  6.476  6.169]* 
Number of banks  1.694  [1.925]  1.077  1.995] 
Region of residence         
Atlantic  0.405  [0.491]  0.431  [0.495]* 
Oriental  0.198  [0.398]  0.214  [0.410] 
Central  0.265  [0.442]  0.218  [0.413]* 
Pacific  0.132  [0.338]  0.138  [345] 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. A * indicates that variable is statistically significant across treatment 
and control municipalities (based on t-tests at the 5% level of significance). 
 
 
Table 4: Probit Estimates: Enrolment 
   Eq(1)  Eq(2) 
log(attacks)  0.051  0.181 
   [0.040]  [0.118] 
(T=1)*log(attacks)  0.075  -0.229 
   [0.060]  [0.177] 
log(attacks)
2     -0.078 
      [0.074] 
(T=1)*log(attacks)
2     0.248 
      [0.116]** 
Constant  2.731  2.492 
   [0.454]***  [0.460]*** 
Observations  21222  21222 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 5: OLS Estimates: Grade Progression 
   Eq(1)  Eq(2) 
log(attacks)  -0.038  -0.452 
   [0.036]  [0.107]*** 
(T=1)*log(attacks)  -0.076  -0.109 
   [0.052]  [0.132] 
log(attacks)
2     0.278 
      [0.069]*** 
(T=1)*log(attacks)
2     0.019 
      [0.074] 
Constant  -7.009  -6.917 
   [0.385]***  [0.388]*** 
Observations  18087  18087 
R-squared  0.71  0.71 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Homework  Housework 
T=1  -0.208  -0.03  0.288  -0.04  0.121  -0.198 
   [0.068]***  [0.060]  [0.000]  [0.021]*  [0.042]***  [0.062]*** 
(T=1)*log(attacks)  0.163  0.129  -0.086  -0.003  -0.216  0.502 
   [0.172]  [0.142]  [0.270]  [0.054]  [0.108]**  [0.162]*** 
(T=1)*log(attacks)
2  -0.008  -0.01  0.05  0.009  0.057  -0.284 
   [0.092]  [0.083]  [0.152]  [0.027]  [0.057]  [0.087]*** 
Observations  18134  18127  18132  18116  18125  18124 
R-squared  0.09  0.06  0.08  0.01  0.05  0.13 
Joint test: (T=1)*log(attacks)+(T=1)*log(attacks)
2 
p-value  0.0468**  0.1133  0.947  0.6286  0.0072***  0.0047*** 
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Figure 4: Effect of Treatment and Attacks on Time Use 













































Figure 5: Impact of log(attacks) on Income of Husband and Wife 
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Figure 6: Days missed at school (Treatment vs. Control) by log(attacks) 
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